Multilevel electoral integration strategies: peronist presidents and mayors in Buenos Aires’ suburbs.

Authors

  • Andrés Lacher Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales «Ambrosio L. Gioja», Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46468/rsaap.13.2.A6

Keywords:

Multilevel integration, municipal level, principal-agent, cooperation, political parties

Abstract

The decentralized character of multilevel integration in stratarchical parties that compete in different arenas, becomes evident in the complex pre-electoral negotiations that take place between incumbents. As a result, the national, provincial and municipal incumbents can adopt cooperation and competition strategies that impact on the competence arenas of their counterparts.The goal of this paper is to explain the variation of these strategies between presidents and mayors of the 24 municipalities of the Buenos Aires’ suburbs in the argentinian peronism, from the analysis of electoral results and integration strategies corresponding to the previous elections. In this vane, the link between incumbents of different arenas will be conceptualized as a relationship between principals and agents, while it will be resorted a cooperation approach. The observable consequences of this analytical frame give rise to two hypotheses, which observational consequences are tested through the employment of logistics regressions and fixed effects panels.

Published

2019-11-01