De la maquinaria partidaria a la industria electoral. Continuidades e incentivos institucionales en la Argentina: del radicalismo al kirchnerismo

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of electoral rules on political competition within the period 1983-2011, taking into account, especially, candidate nomination, changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform, and the law 26571 that approved the “Simultaneously Open and Obligatory Primaries” elections. It argues that, although the effort to democratize the contest, there are still a set of informal practices which have negative consequences in the political parties internal dynamics. This scenario has weakened bureaucratic institutions, and has given a place to an “electoral industry”, that reinforced the leadership role in the political organization, consolidating a type of competition that could be characterized as “parricide”. By which, finding themselves in the impossibility of entering formally to the competition for public office, political actors with electoral interests make strategic alliances to defeat the leaders, and guarantee their access to open elections.