Cuando perdemos la cabeza. La acefalía del ejecutivo en los sistemas presidencialistas de gobierno: Argentina en perspectiva comparada

Abstract

Several authors argument that the constitutional prescription of a limited in-duration and fixed mandate of the holder of the executive authority, simultaneously head of state and head of government, is the preponderant characteristic that defines presidencialism. The main aim of this paper is to analyze to what extent the prescription above mentioned is fulfilled in situations of total acephalia, that is to say, when president and vice-president cannot perform the functions of their position. The hypothesis points out that in situations of total acephalia, the person who assumes the presidency must obligatorily complete the period of whom has provoked the vacancy. This affirmation is justified in the logical characteristics of the system and has bases in constitutional prescriptions. Beginning by the argentine case, and through a compared control of the cases of presidential systems in all America, the article analyzes how the different constitutions anticipate the possibilities of total acephalia. Moreover, it studies to what extent the behaviors of the main institutional and political actors are adjusted to the prescription of limited-in-duration and fixed mandate (...)