El doble voto simultáneo

Abstract

This article analyzes the characteristics of the electoral device called “Double Simultaneous Vote” (DSV) and evaluates its virtues and defects. In first term its legal-formal characteristics are specified showing that it is essentially a sort of intraparty preferential vote rather than a system of vote accumulation. In second place some very simple models are presented to illustrate its political features vis a vis the procedure of primary elections. In this sense, and whenever certain conditions are fulfilled, the DSV offers a set of virtues that makes it superior than the primary elections. Nevertheless, it also generates greater uncertainty and leaves voters with less freedom. Finally, its political effects are evaluated taking as main reference its utilization in the Uruguayan electoral system. The DSV favors the continuity and the maintenance of partisan unit, promoting, at the same time, the internal democratic contestation and the renewal of leaderships. But when the political parties lose their programmatic coherence and are transformed into mere labels, it can generate an important distortion of the citizens’ preferences.