The radix structure of political conflict: Argentina’s impossible game (1955-1966)

Abstract

In this article, we examine a two-dimensional, circular model of political conflict. We consider O’Donnells (1973) canonical interpretation of regime instability in Argentina between 1955 and 1966, the impossible game, and evaluate such characterization empirically through the analysis of roll call votes. Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis supports a two-dimensional radex representation composed of two intercorrelated facets: ideological outlook (its elements being «liberal» versus «nationalistic»), and attitudes toward Peronism. The radex structure, resembling a dart board, derives from the combination of a one-dimensional simplex (with radial lines capturing stands on Peronism) and a one-dimensional circumplex (with concentric circles corresponding to ideological outlook). These findings indicate that, because of the circular —and thus multidimensional— nature of political conflict during the 1955-1966 period, stable political outcomes failed to exist.