The electoral and partisan determinants of popular contention in the Argentine provinces, 1993-2007

Abstract

A body of literature on the relationship between institutions and cycles of popular contention in Latin America stresses that democracies with weak political institutions are more prone to social conflict. However, this literature is limited to cross-country comparisons and does not explain the territorial variations of protest activity within the same democratic regime. Moreover, it focuses on macro-institutional factors and overlooks the incentives of political elites and political parties to demobilize or encourage episodes of protest. Our article addresses these issues and examines the electoral and partisan determinants of societal protest in Argentina’s twenty-three provinces and the City of Buenos Aires in 1993-2007. The findings of our empirical analysis reveal that the incentives created by provincial electoral competition and the influence of the Peronist Party as an opposition party both shape the geographic unevenness of subnational protest activity in the country.