Electoral Cycle, Presidential Popularity, and the Distribution of Federal Funds in Argentina

Authors

  • Lucas González Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, Universidad Nacional de San Martín

Keywords:

Distributive politics, electoral cycle, presidential popularity, federal transfers, Argentina

Abstract

This article analyzes the determinants of the distribution of non-earmarked federal funds to the Argentine provinces between 1999 and 2009. The main contribution is that it brings the electoral cycle together with presidential popularity into the analysis. The main argument is that during election years, presidents tend to distribute more funds to the largest and most populated provinces (I call this electoral distribution). These districts have the largest number of voters. But in non-election years, presidents distribute to less populated, poorer, but overrepresented developing provinces. This is crucial to ensure legislative support (I call this governing distribution). Structural cleavages between rich and poor provinces also overlap with the president’s popularity to influence the distribution of federal funds.

Published

2016-06-26