Represión, exclusión e inclusión: relaciones gobiernosindicatos y modelos de reforma laboral en economías liberalizadas

Abstract

This article argues that the place of labor in market reform coalitions, ranging from democratic inclusion to open labor repression, triggers a tradeoff between the degree of deregulation in the formal sector and the amount of compensations targeted to the unemployed and poor workers in the informal sector. The comparative analysis of Chile (1973-89), Argentina (1989-99) and Spain (1982-96) reveals that the greater the inclusion of organized labor in the policy-making process, the less extensive the reform of the system of industrial relations. Conversely, the more repressive or the further the exclusion of organized labor goes, the higher the degree of labor law deregulation. In addition, when labor is excluded or repressed, the relative importance of compensatory policies in the form of subsidies to the unemployed and unorganized workers in the informal sector is greater.